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Expected value theory has been known for centuries to be subject to critique by St. Petersburg
paradox arguments. And there is a traditional rebuttal of the critique that denies the
empirical relevance of the paradox because of its apparent dependence on existence of
credible offers to pay unbounded sums of money. Neither critique nor rebuttal focus on the
question with empirical relevance: Do people make choices in bounded St. Petersburg games
that are consistent with expected value theory?

This paper reports an experiment that

addresses that question.
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1. Introduction
The first theory of decision under risk, expected value maximization, was challenged long ago
by the St. Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli, 1738). The original St. Petersburg lottery pays 2n
when a fair coin comes up heads for the first time on flip n , an event with probability 1/ 2n .
∞

The expected value of this lottery is infinite: ∑ 2n × (1 / 2n ) = ∞ . But Bernoulli famously
n =1

reported that most people stated they would be unwilling to pay more than a small amount to
play this game. He concluded that such reported preferences called into question the validity
of expected value theory, and offered a theory with decreasing marginal utility of money as a
replacement.
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A traditional rebuttal of the alleged paradox is based on the observation that no agent
can credibly offer the St. Petersburg lottery for another to play in a real payoff experiment –
because it could result in a payout obligation exceeding any agent’s wealth – and therefore
that this challenge to expected value theory has no bite. For example, if the maximum amount
that a supplier of the game can credibly offer to pay is $3.3554×107 (= $225 ) then the St.
Petersburg lottery is a game that actually pays $ 2n if n < 25 , and $ 225 for n ≥ 25 . The
expected value of this game is only $26, so it would not be paradoxical if individuals stated
they would be unwilling to pay large amounts to play the game.
Arguments about the relevance of the St. Petersburg paradox are great sport, especially
now that a generalized form of the paradox has been shown (by Cox and Sadiraj, 2008 and
Rieger and Wang, 2006) to apply to cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman,
1992), dual theory of expected utility theory (Yaari, 1987), rank dependent utility theory
(Quiggin, 1993), and expected utility theory as well as expected value theory. But such
arguments are not an answer to the original question: Does expected value theory have
empirical validity? This question has previously been addressed by numerous empirical
studies but, surprisingly, not by experiments involving St. Petersburg lotteries. This paper
reports an experiment with bounded St. Petersburg lotteries.

2. A Real Experiment with a Finite St. Petersburg Lottery

The experiment was designed as follows. Subjects were offered the opportunity to decide
whether to pay their own money to play nine finite St. Petersburg bets. One of each subject’s
decisions was randomly selected for real money payoff. Bet N had a maximum of N coin
tosses and paid 2n euros if the first head occurred on toss number n , for n = 1, 2,...N , and paid
nothing if no head occurred. Bets were offered for N = 1,2, …,9. Of course, the expected
payoff from playing bet N was N euros. The price offered to a subject for playing bet N was
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25 euro cents lower than N euros. An expected value maximizer would accept every one of
these bets.
The experiment was run at the University of Magdeburg in February 2007. An
English version of the subject instructions is contained in the appendix. Thirty subjects
participated in this experiment: (a) 127 out of 270 (or 47%) of the subjects’ choices are
inconsistent with risk neutrality; and (b) 26 out of 30 (or 87%) of the subjects made at least
one choice inconsistent with risk neutrality. Is the failure rate of expected value theory
statistically significant?
One way to pose the question is to ask which characterization of risk references is
more consistent with the data: (a) risk neutrality; or (b) risk aversion sufficient to imply
rejection of all offers to play the St. Petersburg games in the experiment? First, the observed
fraction of choices consistent with risk neutrality is [0.87, 0.87, 0.8, 0.63, 0.53, 0.43, 0.27, 0.2,
0.17] in St. Petersburg bets for N = 1,2, …, 9, respectively. Recall that expected values of the
nine St. Petersburg bets are [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], respectively. So in the first 5 tasks more
than half the subjects made choices that are consistent with expected value (EV) theory.
However, as the stakes of the sure amount of money required for playing the St. Petersburg
bets increase, and the variance of payoffs of the lotteries increase, subjects risk-averse choices
start to dominate. From bets for N = 6 to 9, the fraction of choices violating EV theory
increases from 57% to 83%.
We apply a linear mixture model (Harless and Camerer, 1994) with stochastic
preference specification for error rate ε : (a) if option Z is stochastically preferred then
Prob(choose Z ) = 1 − ε ; and (b) if option Z is not preferred then Prob(choose Z ) = ε . Let
the letter a denote a subject’s response that she accepts the offer to play a specific St.
Petersburg bet in the experiment. Let r denote rejection of the offer to play the game. The
linear mixture model is used to address the specific question whether, for the nine St.
Petersburg bets offered to the subjects, the response pattern (a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a, a) or the
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response pattern ( r , r , r , r , r , r , r , r , r ) is more consistent with the data. With this specification,
the log-likelihood is -182 and the estimate of the error rate is 0.29. The point estimate of the
proportion of subjects in the experiment that are not risk neutral (or very slightly risk averse)
is 0.48, and the Wald 90% confidence interval of this estimate is (0.30, 0.67). Allowing for a
specification with two error rates (one error rate for bets 1-4 and another error rate for bets 59), the estimates of the error rates are 0.50 for the first four bets and 0.14 for the last five bets.
The point estimate of the proportion of subjects in the experiment that are not risk neutral (or
very slightly risk averse) is 0.77, with Wald 90% confidence interval of (0.63, 0.91). The loglikelihood is -164. Using data only for bets 4 - 9, that require payments in excess of 3 euros to
accept, the error rate is 0.18 and the point estimate of the proportion of subjects in the
experiment that are not risk neutral (or very slightly risk averse) is 0.71 with 90% confidence
interval (0.56, 0.87). The log-likelihood is -103. We conclude that data from the St.
Petersburg experiment are significantly inconsistent with expected value theory.
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Endnote
* Glenn W. Harrison provided helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support was

provided by the National Science Foundation (grant number IIS-0630805).
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Subject Instructions
Please write your identification code here:
A coin is tossed no more than 9 times. Your payoff depends on the number of tosses until Head
appears for the first time. If Head appears for the first time on flip number N then you are paid 2N
Euros. Table 1 shows the possible outcomes:
Table 1
Head appears for the first time on coin toss

Probability this will occur

Your payoff in Euros

1

0.5

2

2

0.25

4

3

0.125

8

4

0.0625

16

5

0.03125

32

6

0.015625

64

7

0.0078125

128

8

0.0039062

256

9

0.0019531

512

Never

0

There are a variety of different lotteries offered to you that differ in the maximum possible number of
coin tosses and the amount you have to pay if you want to participate in the lottery. Table 2 shows this.
Table 2
Maximum number of tosses

Participation fee in Euros

1

0.75

2

1.75

3

2.75

4

3.75

5

4.75

6

5.75

7

6.75

8

7.75

9

8.75

I choose to pay to participate: Yes/No
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For example, if you decide to pay 3.75 Euros to participate in the lottery with a maximum of 4 tosses,
the coin will be flipped 4 times. Your payoff is determined according to Table 1. If Head appears on
the first toss then you will receive 2 Euros, regardless of the results of the further tosses. If Tail
appears on the first toss and Head on the second, you will receive 4 Euros, regardless the results of the
further tosses. If Tails appear on the first two tosses and then Head on the third toss, you will receive 8
Euros, regardless of the further tosses. If Tails appear on the first three tosses, followed by Head on the
fourth toss, you receive 16 Euros. If Head never appears your payoff is 0 Euro.

Payoffs
After you make your decisions, one of the rows will be selected by chance and your Yes or No
decision in that row will become binding. The selection of the row is carried out by drawing a ball
from a bingo cage containing balls with numbers 1,2, …, 9. The number on the drawn ball determines
the row of the table that is selected.
If, for example, row 6 is selected for payoff then: (a) if your decision in row 6 is “No” then no money
changes hands; (b) if your decision in row 6 is “Yes” then you will pay the experimenter 5.75 Euros to
play the coin toss lottery with a maximum of 6 tosses and possible outcomes in the first 6 rows of
Table 1.

